Fighting terrorism takes American forces into urban, jungle, mountainous and desert terrain. Learning the uniqueness and exploring the nuances of different types of warfare is of the utmost importance in the 21st century. Although the reasons the United States is engaged in combat may differ, the terrain does not and we can learn much from past military operations.

John P. Cross began his military career in 1945, and began a lifetime conducting and then fighting insurgents in the jungles of Burma, Vietnam, Malaya, Thailand and other Southeast Asian nations. He has retired to Nepal and has left his decades of wisdom in fighting almost exclusively in the jungle condensed in this book.

Cross begins by setting the stage for jungle warfare, and describes it as ‘‘when phases of war, tactics, training, logistical support, and administration have to be modified because of trees.” He uses World War II Indian Army training manuals that describes three types of jungles from dense to thin, each with its own characteristics. Despite popular myths, the Japanese Imperial Army as masters of jungle warfare, had no jungle warfare doctrine. Part of Japanese strategy was the belief that every Indian was waiting for any excuse to rebel against the British. This strategy never materialized.

Cross discusses how the famous Gen. William Slim understood the nuances of the commonwealth troops and their proven expertise to attach British troops to Australians, who were adapted to fighting in New Guinea. One chapter also discusses jungle survival skills and the important challenges of maintaining personal health and hygiene in the jungle. Japanese Army units were weak in patrolling and relied heavily on locals for information. This lack of reconnaissance of occupied territory would become a real disadvantage to the Japanese.

The author discusses post-World War II jungle wars that discussed Communist Revolutionary Warfare, not to be confused with Soviet military doctrine, an exclusive Asian form of revolutionary warfare that developed main-force units, regional forces and village guerillas, integrating them into jungle warfare tactics. This would be applied to American forces in Vietnam with the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) providing conventional warfare options, with the guerillas warfare of the Viet-Cong.

The book also contains interesting anecdotes such as the real danger of coconuts and felled trees falling on combatants and causing casualties. Another regrettable casualty highlighted by the author is caused by throwing grenades and having the ordnance hit a tree and bounce back towards the thrower and his unit.

Editor’s Note: Aboul-Enein maintains a regular book review column in the Naval District Washington Waterline and Bolling Aviator. He delivers a series of popular lectures on the Middle East and militant Islamist groups to deploying units.